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Abstract 
Proof planning is an approach to the automation of theorem proving in 
which search is conducted, not at the object-level, but among a set of proof 
methods. This approach dramatically reduces the amount of search but at 
the cost of completeness. We critically examine proof planning, identifying 
both its strengths and weaknesses. We use this analysis to explore ways of 
enhancing proof planning to overcome its current weaknesses. 
Preamble 
This paper consists of two parts: 
1. an introduction to proof planning for those new to the topic; and 
2. a critique of proof planning organised as a 4x3 array. 
Those already familiar with proof planning may want to skip straight to the critique 
which starts at §2, p3. 
1 Background 
Proof planning is a technique for guiding the search for a proof in automated theorem 
proving, [Bundy, 1988, Bundy, 1991, Kerber, 1998]. The main idea is to identify 
common patterns of reasoning in families of similar proofs; to represent them in a 
computational fashion; and to use them to guide the search for a proof of conjectures 
from the same family. For instance, proofs by mathematical induction share the 
common pattern depicted in figure 1. This common pattern has been represented in 
the proof planners Clam and A Clam and used to guide a wide variety of inductive 
proofs, [Bundy et al, 1990b, Bundy et at, 1991, Richardson et al, 1998]. 
1.1 Proof Plans and Critics 
The common patterns of reasoning are represented using tactics, computer programs 
which control proof search by applying rules of inference, [Gordon et at, 19791. 
These tactics are specified by methods. These methods give both the preconditions 
under which the tactics are applicable and the effects of their successful application. 
Meta-level reasoning is used to combine the tactics into a customised proof plan for 
the current conjecture. This meta-level reasoning matches the preconditions of later 
tactics to the effects of earlier ones. Examples of such customised proof plans are 
given in figure 2. 
Proof planning has been extended to capture common causes of proof failure 
and ways to patch them, [Ireland, 1992, Ireland & Bundy, 1996b]. With each proof 
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Inductive proofs start with the application of an induction rule, which 
reduces the conjecture to some base and step cases. One of each is 
shown above. In the step case rippling reduces the difference between 
the induction conclusion and the induction hypothesis (see § 1.2, p3 for 
more detail). Fertilization applies the induction hypothesis to simplify 
the rippled induction conclusion. 
1: ind..strat: A Stratezv for Inductive Proof 
method are associated some proof critics. Critics have a similar format to methods, 
but their preconditions specify situations in which the method's associated tactic 
will fail and instead of tactics they have instructions on patching a failed proof. 
Each of the critics associated with a method has a different precondition. These 
are used to decide on an appropriate patch. Most of the critics built to date have 
been associated with the ripple method, or rather with its principle sub-method, 
wave, which applies one ripple step (see §1.2, p3). Among the patches these critics 
suggest are: a generalisation of the current conjecture; the use of an intermediate 
lemma; a case split; and a different induction rule. The use of a critic to generalise 
a conjecture is illustrated in figure 8. 
Proof planning has been tested successfully on a wide range of inductive and 
other theorems. These include conjectures arising from formal methods, i.e. from 
the verification, synthesis and transformation of both software and hardware. They 
include, for instance: the transformation of naive into tail recursive programs, 
[Hesketh et al, 1992]; the verification of a microprocessor, [Cantu et al, 1996]; the 
synthesis of logic programs, [Kraan et al, 1996], decision procedures, [Armando et a!, 19961 
and the rippling tactic, [Gallagher, 19931. Critics are especially useful at coming 
up with, so called, 'eureka' steps, i.e. those that usually seem to require human in-
tervention, for instance suggesting induction rules, intermediate lemmas and gener-
alisations, [Ireland & Bundy, 1996b, Ireland & Bundy, 1996a], and loop invariants, 
[Ireland & Stark, 1997]. 
Proof planning has also been applied outwith mathematics to the computer 
games of bridge, [Frank et a!, 19921, and Go, [Willmott et al, 19991, and also to 
problems of configuring systems from parts, [Lowe, 1991, Lowe et al, 19961. 
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x+(y+z)=(x+y)+z x+y=y+x 
The associativity of + is an especially simple theorem, which can be 
proved with a single application of ind...strat from figure 1, using a one 
step induction rule on induction variable x. The commutativity of + is a 
bit more complicated. ind_strat is first applied using induction variable 
x then in both the base and step cases there is a nested application of 
ind_strat using y. The first argument of ind_strat indexes the induction 
rule using the rippling concept of wave-fronts (see § 1.2, p5). The second 
argument specifies the induction variable. 
Figure 2: Special-Purpose Proof Plans 
1.2 Rippling 
Rippling is the key method in proof plans for inductive proof. Not only does it 
guide the manipulation of the induction conclusion to prepare it for the application 
of the induction hypothesis, but preparation for rippling suggests an appropriate 
induction rule and variable, and different patterns of rippling failure suggest new 
lemmas and generalisations. Since it is also cited several times in the critique, we 
have included a brief introduction to rippling here. 
Rippling is useful whenever there is a goal to be proved in the context of one or 
more 'givens'. Givens may be axioms, previously proved theorems, assumptions or 
hypotheses. It works by calculating the difference between the goal and the given(s) 
and then systematically reducing it. The similarities and differences between the 
goal and given(s) are marked with meta-level annotations. These annotations are 
shown graphically in figure 5, where the notation of rippling is explained. An 
example of rippling is given in figure 6. 
2 Critique 
Our critique of proof planning is organised along two dimensions. On the first di-
mension we consider four different aspects of proof planning: (1) its potential for 
advance formation; (2) its theorem proving power; (3) its support for interaction; 
and (4) its methodology. On the second dimension, for each aspect of the first 
dimension we present: (a) the original dream; (b) the reality of current implemen-
tations and (c) the options available for overcoming obstacles and realising part of 
that original dream. 
2.1 The Advance Formation of Plans 
2.1.1 The Dream 
In the original proposal for proof planning, [Bundy, 1988], it was envisaged that 
the formation of a proof plan for a conjecture would precede its use to guide the 
rev(nil) = nil 
rev(H :: T) = rev(T) <> (H :: nil) 
qrev(nil, L) = L 
qrev(H :: T, L) = qrev(T, H :: L) 
rev and qrev are alternative recursive functions for reversing a list. 
Each is defined by a one-step list recursion using a base and step case. 
:: is an infix list cons and C> an infix list append. rev is a naive reverse 
function and qrev a more efficient, tail-recursive function. The second 
argument of qrev is called an accumulator. This accumulator should be 
set to nil when qrev is first applied to reverse a list. Figure 4  states two 
theorems that relate these two functions. 
Figure 3: Recursive Definitions of Two Reverse Functions 
Vk. rev(k) = qrev(k,nil) 	 (1) 
Vk,l. rev(k) <>1 = qrev(k,l) 	 (2) 
Theorem (1) shows that rev and qrev output the same result from the 
same input when the accumulator of qrev is initialised to nil. Theorem 
(2) generalises theorem (1) for all values of this accumulator. Paradox-
ically, the more specialised theorem (1) is harder to prove. One way to 
prove it is to generalise it to theorem (2). 
Figure 4: Two Theorems about List Reversing Functions 
search for a proof. Meta-level reasoning would be used to join general proof plans 
together by matching the preconditions of later ones to the effects of earlier ones. A 
tactic would then be extracted from the customised proof plan thus constructed. A 
complete proof plan would be sent to a tactic-based theorem prover where it would 
be unpacked into a formal proof with little or no search. 
2.1.2 The Reality 
Unfortunately, in practice, this dream proved impossible to realise. The problem 
is due to the impossibility of checking the preconditions of methods against purely 
abstract formulae. For instance, the preconditions of rippling include checking of 
the presence of wave-fronts in the current goal formula, that a wave-rule matches a 
sub-expression of this goal and that any new inwards wave-fronts have a wave-hole 
containing a sink. These preconditions cannot be checked unless the structure of 
the goal is known in some detail. To know this structure requires anticipating the 
effects of the previous methods in the current plan. The simplest way to implement 
this is to apply each of the tactics of the previous methods in order. 
Similar arguments hold for most of the other proof methods used by proof plan-
ners. This is especially true in applications to game playing where the different 
counter actions of the opposing players must be explored before a response can be 
planned, [Willmott et al, 1999]. So the reality is an interleaving of proof planning 
and proof execution. Moreover, the proof is planned in a consecutive fashion, i.e. the 
Given: rev(t) < > L = qrev(t,L) 
Goal: rev([j_::ffljt ) <> LlJ = qrev([hHj t lli) 
Wave-Rules: 
rev(LIItjt) => rev(T)[<> H ::niii 
	
(3) 
qrev([i?ijJt , L) 
	 qrev(T, EH ::ftJ4) 
	
(4) 
c1rvlilt <>Z X <> (EY>1E) 	 (5) 
The example is drawn from the inductive proof of theorem () in figure 
4. The given and the goal are the induction hypothesis and induction 
conclusion, respectively, of this theorem. Wave-rides (3) and (4) are 
annotated versions of the step cases of the recursive definitions of the 
two list reversing functions in figure S. Wave-nile (5) is from the asso-
ciativity of<>. 
The grey boxes are called wave-fronts and the holes in them are called 
wave-holes. The wave-fronts in the goal indicate those places where the 
goal differs from the given. Those in the wave-rides indicate the differ-
ences between the left and right hand sides of the rules. The arrows on 
the wave-fronts indicate the direction in which rippling will move them: 
either outwards (t) or inwards (4.). The corners around the I in the 
goal indicate a sink. A sink is one of ripplings target locations for wave-
fronts; the other target location is surrounding an instance of the whole 
given. 
The wave-rides are used to rewrite each side of the goal. The effect is to 
move the wave-fronts either to surround an instance of the given or to 
be absorbed into a sink. An example of this process is given in figure 6 
5: The Notation of 
proof steps are developed starting at one end of the proof then proceeding in order. 
At any stage of the planning process an initial or final segment of the object-level 
proof is known. 
2.1.3 The Options 
One response to this reality is to admit defeat, abandon proof planning and instead 
recycle the preconditions of proof methods as preconditions for the application of 
tactics. Search can then be conducted in a space of condition/action production 
rules in which the conditions are the method preconditions and the actions are 
the corresponding tactics. Satisfaction of a precondition will cause the tactic to 
be applied thus realising the preconditions of subsequent tactics. Essentially, this 
strategy was implemented by Horn in the Oyster2 system, [Horn, 19921. The ex-
perimental results were comparable to earlier versions of Clam, i.e. if tactics are 
applied as soon as they are found to be applicable then proof planning conveys no 
advantage over Horn's production rule approach. 
However, in subsequent developments some limited abstraction has been intro- 
Given: rev(t) <> L = qrev(t, L) 
Goal: 
rev(lhflhlt) <> [lj =qrev(lhfl1t 
 [•5j) 
(Jrev(t)hTJ.TilJt ) <> [IJ =qrev(t, [h :: lj) 
rev(t) c> [(h :: nil) C> lj =qrev(t, Lh :: lj) 
rev(t) c> [h :: lj =qrev(t, Lh :: lj) 
The example comes from the step case of the inductive proof of theo- 
rem (2) from figure 4. Note that the induction variable k becomes the 
constant t in the given and the wave-front rnrrtlt in the goal. How-
ever, the other universal variable, 1, becomes a first-order meta-variable 
L in the given, but a sink [lj in the goal. We use uppercase to indicate 
meta-variables and lowercase for object-level variables and constants. 
The left-hand wave-front is rippled-out using wave-rule (3) from figure 5, 
but then rippled-sideways using wave-rule (5), where it is absorbed into 
the left-hand sink. The right-hand wave-front is rippled-sideways using 
wave-rule (4) and absorbed into the right-hand sink. After the left-hand 
sink is simplified, using the recursive definition of .c>, the contents of 
the two sinks are identical and the goal can be fertilized with the given, 
completing the proof. Note that fertilization unifies the meta-variable L 
with the sink h:: 1. 
Note that there is no point in rippling sideways unless this absorbs wave-
fronts into sinks. Sinks mark 1he potential to unify wave-fronts with 
rneta-variables during fertilization. Without sinks to absorb the wave-
fronts, fertilization will fail. Such a failure is illustrated in figure 7 
6: An Example of 
duced into proof planning, in particular, the use of (usually second-order) meta-
variables. In many cases the method preconditions can be checked on such partially 
abstract formulae. This allows choices in early stages of the proof to be delayed then 
made subsequently, e.g. as a side effect of unification of the meta-variables. We call 
this middle-out reasoning because it permits the non-consecutive development of a 
proof, i.e. instead of having to develop a proof from the top down or the bottom 
up we can start in the middle and work outwards. Middle-out reasoning can sig-
nificantly reduce search by postponing a choice with a high branching factor until 
the correct branch can be determined. Figure 8 provides an example of middle-out 
reasoning. 
Among the choices that can be successfully delayed in this way are: the witness 
of an existential variable; the induction rule, [Bundy et al, 1990a]; an intermediate 
lemma; and generalisation of a goal, [Ireland & Bundy, 1996b, Ireland & Bundy, 1996a]. 
Each of these has a high branching factor - infinite in some cases. A single abstract 
branch containing meta-variables can simultaneously represent all the alternative 
branches. Incremental instantiation of the meta-variables as a side effect of sub-
sequent proof steps will implicitly exclude some of these branches until only one 
Given: rev(t) = qrev(t, nil) 
Goal: 
rev(jhIl ) = qrev( h ;: wit ,nil) 
=qrev(Fh :: wit ,nil) 
blocked 
The example comes from the failed step case of the inductive proof of 
theorem (1) from figure 4. A particular kind of ripple failure is illus-
trated. 
The left-hand wave-front can be rippled-out using wave-rule (3) and is 
then completely rippled. However, the right-hand wave-front cannot be 
rippled-sideways even though wave-nile (4) matches it. This is because 
there is no sink to absorb the resulting inwards directed wave-front. If 
the wave-rule was nevertheless applied then any subsequent fertilization 
attempt would fail. 
Figure 8 shows how to patch the proof by a generalisation aimed to in-
troduce a sink into the appropriate place in the theorem and thus allow 
the ripple to succeed. 
7: A Failed 
remains. Even though the higher-order' unification required to whittle down these 
choices is computationally expensive the cost is far less than the separate explo-
ration of each branch. We have exploited this middle-out technique to especially 
good effect in our use of critics, [Ireland & Bundy, 1996b]. 
Middle-out reasoning recovers a small part of the original dream of advance proof 
planning and provides some sigxiificant search control advantage over the mere use 
of method preconditions in tactic-based production rules. 
2.2 The Theorem Proving Power of Proof Planning 
2.2.1 The Dream 
One of the main aims of proof planning was to enable automatic theorem provers 
to prove much harder theorems than conventional theorem provers were capable 
of. The argument was that the meta-level planning search space was considerably 
smaller than the object-level proof search space. This reduction was partly due to 
the fact that proof methods only capture common patterns of reasoning, excluding 
many unsuccessful parts of the space. It was also because the higher-level meth-
ods, e.g. ind..strat, each cover many object-level proof steps. Moreover, the use of 
abstraction devices, like meta-variables, enables more than one proof branch to be 
explored simultaneously. Such search space reductions should bring much harder 
proofs into the scope of exhaustive search techniques. 
'Onty second-order unification is required for the examplas tackled so far, but higher-order 
unification is required in the general case. 
2.2.2 The Reality 
This dream has been partially realised. The reduced search space does allow the 
discovery of proofs that would be beyond the reach of purely object-level provers. 
Unfortunately, these very search reduction measures can also exclude the proofs of 
hard theorems from the search space, making them impossible to find. The reduced 
plan space is incomplete. Hard theorems may require uncommon or even brand new 
patterns of reasoning, which have not been previously captured in proof methods. 
Or they may require existing tactics to be used in unusual ways that are excluded 
by their current heuristic preconditions. Indeed, it is often a characteristic of a 
breakthrough in mathematical proof that the proof incorporates some new kind of 
proof method, ci Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. Such proofs will not be found 
by proof planning, but could potentially be stumbled upon by exhaustive search at 
the object-level. 
2.2.3 The Options 
Firstly, we consider ways of reducing the incompleteness of proof planning, then 
ways of removing it. 
We should strive to ensure that the preconditions of methods are as general 
as possible, for instance, minimising the use of heuristic preconditions, as opposed 
to preconditions that are required for the legal application of the method's tactic. 
This will help ensure that the tactic is applied whenever it is appropriate and not 
excluded due to a failure to anticipate its unusual usage. A balance is required 
here since the absence of all heuristic preconditions may increase the search space 
to an infeasible size. Rather diligence is needed to design both tactics and their 
preconditions which generalise away from the particular examples that may have 
suggested the reasoning pattern in the first place. 
The use of critics expands the search space by providing a proof patch when 
the preconditions of a method fail. In practice, critics have been shown to facilitate 
the proof of hard theorems by providing the 'eureka' steps, e.g. missing lemmas, 
goal generalisations, unusual induction rules, that hard theorems often require, 
[Ireland & Bundy, 1996b]. However, even with these additions, the plan space is 
still incomplete, so the problem is only postponed. 
One way to restore completeness would be to allow arbitrary object-level proof 
steps. Since such a facility is at odds with the philosophy of proof planning its 
use would need to be carefully restricted. For instance, a proof method could be 
provided that made a single object-level proof step at random, but only when all 
other possibilities had been exhausted. Provided that the rest of the plan space was 
finite, i.e. all other proof methods were terminating, then this random method would 
occasionally be called and would have the same potential for stumbling upon new 
lines of proof that an purely object-level exhaustive prover does, i.e. we would not 
expect it to happen very often - if at all. It is interesting to speculate about whether 
it would be possible to draw a more permanent benefit from such serendipity by 
learning a new proof method from the example proof. 
Alternatively, we could provide a new proof method that allowed a human user 
to insert an object-level proof step into the proof at any time. As well as providing 
an escape mechanism for a frustrated user this might also be a valuable device for 
the system developer. It would enable them to concentrate on the part of a proof 
they were interested in automating while using interaction to 'fake' the other parts. 
2.3 The Support for Interaction of Proof Planning 
2.3.1 The Dream 
Proof planning is not just useful for the automation of proof, it can also assist its 
interactive development. The language of proof planning describes the high-level 
structure of a proof and, hence, provides a high-level channel of communication 
between machine and user. This can be especially useful in a very large proof whose 
description at the object-level is unwieldy. The different proof methods chunk the 
proof into manageable pieces at a hierarchy of levels. The method preconditions 
and effects describe the relationships between and within each chunk and at each 
level. For instance, the language of rippling enables a proof state to be described in 
terms of differences between goals and givens, why it is important to reduce those 
differences and of ways to do so. 
The preconditions and effects of methods and critics support the automatic 
analysis and patching of failed proof attempts. Thus the user can be directed to the 
reasons for a failed proof and the kind of steps required to remedy the situation. 
This orients the user within a large and complex search space and gives useful hints 
as to how to proceed. This has been realised, for instance, in the work of Jackson, 
[Jackson, 1997, Ireland et at, 1999], in which the user assists in the provision of goal 
generalisations, missing lemmas, etc. by instantiating meta-variables. 
2.3.2 The Reality 
The work of Lowe, Jackson and others in the XBarnacle system, [Lowe & Duncan, 1997], 
shows that proof planning can be of considerable assistance in interactive proof. 
However, each of the advantages listed in the previous section brings corresponding 
disadvantages. 
Firstly, proof planning provides an enriched language of human/computer com-
munication but at the price of introducing new jargon for the user to understand. 
The user must learn the meaning of wave-fronts, flawed inductions, fertilization, 
etc. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the new channel of communication directs at 
the cost of restricting the actions of the user. For instance, Xliarnacte users can get 
an explanation of why a method or critic did or did not apply in terms of successful 
or failed preconditions. They can over-ride those preconditions to force or prevent 
a method or critic applying. But their actions are restricted to the search space of 
tactics and critics, if the proof lies outside that space then they are unable to direct 
XBaniacle to find it. 
2.3.3 The Options 
The first problem can be ameliorated in a number of ways. Jargon can be avoided, 
translated or explained according to the expertise and preferences of the user. For 
instance, "fertilization" can be translated or explained as the "use of the induc-
tion hypothesis". Thus, although this problem can be irritating it can be readily 
mitigated. 
The second problem is more fundamental and relates directly to the incom-
pleteness of the plan space as discussed in g2.2.2. One solution is the same as that 
discussed at the end of 2.2.3, i.e. the provision of a new method allowing the appli-
cation of an object-level proof step under user control. The challenge is to integrate 
this into the rest of the proof planning account, for instance, what story can we 
tell about how this object-level step exploits the effects of previous methods and 
enables the preconditions of subsequent ones? 
2.4 The Methodology of Proof Planning 
2.4.1 The Dream 
Proof planning aims to capture common patterns of reasoning and repair in meth-
ods and critics. In [Bundy, 1991] we provide a number of criteria by which these 
methods and critics are to be assessed. These include expectancy 2 , generality, pre-
scriptiveness, simplicity, efficiency and parsimony. In particular, each method and 
critic should apply successfully in a wide range of situations (generality) and a few 
methods and critics should generate a large number of proofs (parsimony). More-
over, the linking of effects of earlier methods and critics to the preconditions of 
later ones should enable a good 'story' to be told about how and why the proof 
plan works. This 'story' enables the expectancy criterion to be met. 
2.4.2 The Reality 
It is hard work to ensure that these criteria are met. A new method or critic may 
originally be inspired by only a handful of examples. There is a constant danger of 
producing methods and critics that are too fine tuned to these initial examples. This 
can arise both from a lack of imagination in generalising from the specific situation 
and from the temptation to get quick results in automation. Such over-specificity 
leads to a proliferation of methods and critics with limited applicability. Worse still, 
the declarative nature of methods may be lost as methods evolve into arbitrary code 
tuned to a particular problem set. The resulting proof planner will be brittle, i.e. 
will frequently fail when confronted with new problems. It will become increasing 
hard to tell an intelligible story about its reasoning. Critical reviewers will view the 
empirical results with suspicion, suspecting that the system has been hand-tuned 
to reproduce impressive results on only a handful of hard problems. 
As the consequences of over-specificity manifest themselves in failed proof at-
tempts so the methods and critics can be incrementally generalised to cope with the 
new situations. One can hope that this process of incremental generalisation will 
converge on a few robust methods and critics, so realising the original dream. How-
ever, a reviewer may suspect that this process is both infinite and non-deterministic, 
with each incremental improvement only increasing the range of the methods and 
critics by a small amount. 
2.4.3 The Options 
• - 
	 The challenge is- not only to adopt a development methodology that meets the 
criteria in [Bundy, 19911 but also to be seen to do so. This requires both diligence 
in the development of proof plans and the explicit demonstration of this diligence. 
Both aims can be achieved by experimental or theoretical investigations designed 
to test explicit hypotheses. 
For instance, to test the criterion of generality, systematic and thorough am 
plication of proof planning systems should be conducted. This testing requires a 
large-and diverse set of examples obtained from independent sources. The diversity 
should encompass the form, source and difficulty level of the examples. However, 
the generality of the whole system should not be obtained at the cost of parsi-
mony, i.e. by providing lots of methods and critics, 'hand crafted' to cope with 
each problematic example. So each of the methods and critics must be shown to be 
general-purpose. Unfortunately, it is not possible to test each one in isolation, since 
the methods and critics are designed to work as a family. However, it is possible to 
record how frequently each method and critic is used during the course of a large 
test run. 
2 Some degree of assurance that the proof plan will succeed. 
1111 
To meet the criterion of expectancy the specifications of the methods and critics 
should be declarative statements in a meta-logic. It should be demonstrated that 
the effects of earlier methods enable the preconditions of later ones and that the 
patches of critics invert the failed preconditions of the methods to which they are 
attached. 
To meet the criterion of prescriptiveness the search space generated by rival 
methods needs to be compared either theoretically or experimentally. However, 
reductions in search space should not be obtained at the cost of unacceptable re-
ductions in success rate. So it might be shown experimentally and/or via expectancy 
arguments that acceptable success rates are maintained. Reduced search spaces will 
usually contribute to increased efficiency, but it is possible that precondition testing 
is computationally expensive and that this cost more than offsets the benefits of 
the increased prescriptiveness, so overall efficiency should also be addressed. 
3 Conclusion 
In this paper we have seen that some of the original dreams of proof planning have 
not been fully realised in practice. We have shown that in some cases it has not been 
possible to deliver the dream in the form in which it was originally envisaged, for 
instance, because of the impossibility of testing method preconditions on abstract 
formulae or the inherent incompleteness of the planning search space. In each case 
we have investigated whether and how a lesser version of the original dream can 
be realised. This investigation both identifies the important benefits of the proof 
planning approach and points to the most promising directions for future research. 
In particular, there seem to be three important lessons that have permeated the 
analysis. 
Firstly, the main benefits of proof planning are in facilitating a non-consecutive 
exploration of the search space, e.g. by 'middle-out' reasoning. This allows the 
postponement of highly branching choice points using least commitment mecha-
nisms, such as meta-variables. Parts of the search space with low branching rates 
are explored first and the results of this search determine the postponed choices 
by side-effect, e.g. using higher-order unification. This can result in dramatic 
search space reductions. In particular, 'eureka' steps can be made, in which gener-
alisations, intermediate lemmas, customised induction rules, etc are incrementally 
constructed. The main vehicle for such non-consecutive exploration is critics. Our 
analysis points to the further development of critics as the highest priority in proof 
planning research. 
Secondly, in order to increase the coverage of proof planners in both automatic 
and interactive theorem proving it is necessary to combine it with more brute force 
approaches. For instance, it may be necessary to have default methods in which 
arbitrary object-level proof steps are conducted either at random or under user coil-
trol. One might draw an analogy with simulated annealing in which it is sometimes 
necessary to make a random move in order to escape from a local minimum. 
Thirdly, frequent and systematic rational reconstruction is necessary to off-set 
the tendency to develop over-specialised methods and critics. This tendency is a 
natural by-product of the experimental development of proof planning as specifi-
cations are tweaked and tuned to deal with challenging examples. It is necessary 
to clean-up non-declarative specifications, merge and generalise methods and crit-
ics and to test proof planners in a systematic and thorough way. The assessment 
criteria of [Bundy, 1991] must be regularly restated and reapplied. 
Despite the limitations exposed by the analysis of this paper, proof planning 
has been shown to have a real potential for efficient and powerful, automatic and 
interactive theorem proving. Much of this potential still lies untapped and our 
11 
analysis has identified the priorities and directions for its more effective realisation. 
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Schematic Conjecture: Vk,l. F(rev(k),l) = qrev(k,G(l)) 
Given: F(rev(t),L) = qrev(t,G(L)) 
Goal: 
F(rev(yliflflt) jj) = qrev(Vhfltl t ,c([Ij)) 
F(Ire7(7)hT.Tffi1It Lu) = qrev(t, fG(t.lJ)j) 
rev(t) <>(fh'flnilF'irev(t)flhT-!flilJt 	 ) = qrev(t, 
 
rev(t) <> 
	
) = qrev(t, fG(  LlJ)I) 
rev(t) <> ([h lJ) =qrev(t, Lh :: lj) 
Meta-Variable Bindings: 
An,v. u <>F'(u,v)/F 
.Xu,v. v./F' 
Au. u./G 
Generalised Conjecture: Yk, 1. rev(k) <>1 = qrev(k, 1) 
The example shows how the failed proof attempt in figure 7 can be anal-
ysed using a critic and patched in order to get a successful proof. The 
patch generalises the theorem to be proved by introducing an additional 
universal variable and hence a sink. Middle-out reasoning is used to 
delay determining the exact form of the generalisation. This form is 
determined later as a side effect of higher-order unification during rip-
pling. 
First a schematic conjecture is introduced. A new universal variable 
I is introduced, in the right-hand side, at the point where a sink was 
required in the failed proof in figure 7. Since we are not sure exactly how 
1 relates to the rest of the right-hand side a second-order met a-variable C 
is wrapped around it. On the left-hand side a balancing occurrence of I is 
introduced using the meta-variable F. Note that 1 becomes a first-order 
meta-variable L in the given, but a sink LlJ in the goal. 
Induction on Ic, rippling, simplification and fertilization are now ap-
plied, but higher-order unification is used to instantiate F and C. If 
the schematic conjecture is now instantiated we see that the generalised 
conjecture is, in fact, theorem (2) from figure 4. 
Figure 8: Patching a Failed Proof using Middle-Out Reasoning 
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